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The Postwar Pattern of Mortgage
Interest Rates
THE course of mortgage interest rates and its relationship to the flow
of mortgage funds are referred to in most chapters of this report.
Separate treatment is given here to that subject, so fundamentally
important to an understanding of postwar market developments. The
influence of shifting market forces on mortgage flows has often been
transmitted through changes in mortgage interest rates and yields and in
their relationship to yields of other capital market securities.'Little
current information on these points has been available, and obtaining
data is difficult because of the complexities of interrelationships between
mortgage interest rates, other mortgage terms, and the demand and
supply of mortgage funds. Obviously, such gaps in our knowledge of this
important area- cannot be filled by what follows. We may hope that a
future broad-scaled study of interest rates, as suggested by the National
Bureau, will include the mortgage field. Meanwhile, a beginning is made
here by presentation of new data on conventional mortgage interest
rates, by examination of the effects of discounts on FHA and VA loans,
and by analysis of the relationship of changes in mortgage yields to
changes in the flow of mortgage funds.
Courseof Conventional Alortgage InterestRates
When this study was undertaken, neither monthly nor quarterly series
on conventional residential mortgage interest rates were available on a
current basis, and the few regional annual series suffered from many
shortcomings.2 Within the limited resources of the present study, new
quarterly data on conventional mortgage interest rates were obtained,
home and income properties separately. Their important limi.-
tations are due primarily to their source—the experience of but a few major
1Theterm interest rate generally refers to the rate specified in the mortgage contract;
the term yield refers to the actual return to lenders based on the prices at which mortgages
arid securities are purchased in the market.
2Long-terminterest rate series covering all types of real estate in Manhattan, the
Bronx, Chicago, and St. Louis were included in the study, Capital Formation in Residential
Real Estate:Trends and Prospects, by Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956. Only the
data for Manhattan and St. Louis extended beyond 1940. Because the series are limited
in geographic coverage and cover all types of real estate, interpretation becomes difficult.
Other limitations of the series are discussed in Chapter 15 and Appendix 0 of that study,
which also includes a general analysis of the long-term relationships between mortgage
interest rates, general interest rates, and residential building.
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life insurance companies, But, as noted later in the chapter, the series tie
in well with broader annual series developed for earlier years by the
National Bureau. Moreover, because of significant geographic differen-
tials between mortgage interest rates (see the last section of this chapter),
a hypothetical national series is represented better by a few large life
insurance companies, which acquire conventional loans throughout the
country, than it would be by larger numbers of other types of lenders
whose mortgage lending activity is concentrated locally. The series to
follow, therefore, notwithstanding significant qualifications, do provide
a reasonably accurate measure of the general levels and movements of
conventional mortgage interest rates which can be studied in relation to
yields on other capital market securities in the postwar decade.
AMPLITUDE OF CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE INTEREST RATE MOVEMENTS
Quarterly conventional mortgage interest rates on one- to four-family
houses, as shown in Chart 7, fluctuated within a fairly narrow range of
between 4.35 and 5.09 per cent, from 1946 through 1956.For major
types of bonds, the amplitude of fluctuation during the period was
substantially greater, not only relatively but even absolutely:for out-
standing corporate bonds (2.49 to 3.68), U.S. government bonds (2.14
to 3.30),andmunicipal bonds (0.96 to 2.86). This finding of the relative
amplitude of mortgage interest rates and bond yields in the postwar
decade agrees generally with those of Grebler, Blank,' and Winnick on
movements during half a century.3 The relative difference in the ampli-
tude cf fluctuation in the short postwar period was, however, much
smaller than in the longer period from the turn of the century. Also in
general agreement with findings of that study is the conformity of broad
movements in mortgage rates and bond yields in reflecting the pervasive
influe rice of capital market conditions. A significant additional fact
revealed by the new quarterly series, however, is the consistent lag in the
movements of mortgage interest rate changes behind those of changes in
bond yields. Both the narrowness of fluctuations in mortgage interest rates
and the lag in reaction to changes in capital market conditions reflect basic
differences in mortgage market techniques and characteristics compared
with those of other capital markets.
Other explanations of differences in amplitude of fluctuation have
been advanced. The explanation given by Grebler, Blank, and Winnick
relies in large part on the fact that the mortgage interest rate series refers to
loans made, while the bond yield series they used refers to outstandings.
Ibid., p.223.
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CHART7















SOURCE: Data on corporate Aaa, municipal Aaa, and U.S. government securities are
quarterly averages of monthly yield figures. The U.S. government bond series consists of
fully taxable, marketable 24 per cent bonds due or first callable after twelve years,
through Sept. 30, 1955, and those due or callable in ten to twenty years, beginning Oct. 1,
1955. The series on outstanding corporate and municipal yields are from Moody's Investor
Service; and on U.S. Governments is from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The new corporate issues series begins in 1951, from the First National City Bank of New
York, and represents high grade corporate bonds adjusted to Aaa basis. Data on FHA
and VA mortgage interests rates are the maximum legal rates established by statute or
administrative decision.Data on conventional home mortgage interest rates are a
weighted average of contract rates on loans closed by two life insurance companies from
1947 to 1951 and by two additional companies from 1951 to 1956. The series is affected
little whether it is based on data from two or four companies because of close agreement
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Changing market conditions can effect outstanding bonds, they conclude,
only through price or yield. On new mortgage loans the effect can take the
form o1 changes in other related factors including "loan-to-value ratios,
appraisals, contract terms, noninterest costs, and the ratio of loan rejec-
tions, as well as contract interest rates. Also, since the data show contract
interest rates rather than yields on mortgages, they fail to reflect changes in
premiums and discounts on mortgage loans, at times important in the
mortgage market."4
One implication of their explanation—that a yield series on new bond
issues would move more narrowly than one on outstandings—is not borne
out by yield data on new corporate bond offerings. The new corporate
issues series shown in Chart 7, for example, fluctuated more widely during
1951—1956 than the series on outstanding corporate issues did. This obser-
vation conforms to the generally accepted view that, for most capital mar-
ket securities, yields on new issues are more sensitive to market develop-
ments than are outstandings. The explanation of the narrower amplitude
of mortgage interest rates compared to bond yields must lie, therefore, in
the basic differences between the two types of debt instruments and between
the markets in which they are negotiated and traded.
Markets characterized generally by close pricing are those in which
highly standardized commodities are traded.Price is the main point of
negotiation. The market for Aaa corporate issues is a good example.
Most of the terms associated with public offerings—provisions for
callability, sinking funds, and refundability—follow a fairly standardized
pattern.In long-term bond issues, furthermore, the question of specific
maturity, that is, whether repayment is to be in twenty or thirty years is
of little consequence. Moreover, by definition, the credit of the borrower
offering an Aaa series and usually the size of loan are not in question.
As we move away from standardized to more differentiated markets and
commodities the number of variables, in addition to price, to be negotiated
multiplies.In the market for direct placement of corporate securities,
for example, there are more terms to negotiate than in the market for
public offerings. The market for residential mortgages is an example of the
most differentiated, because few markets are characterized by more one-of-
a-kind deals. The credit of each borrower must be established, and "credit
worth:iness" becomes a function of the relative tightness of capital markets.
Numerous contract terms other than price are subject to individual
negotiation—downpayment requirements, amortization provisions, con-
tract rilaturities, prepayment penalties, and noninterest costs. The nature
Ibid., p.223.
77POSTWAR PATTERN OF MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
andlocation of the particular residential unit securing the mortgage,
moreover, are important factors in a mortgage transaction.
All these elements are more sensitive than the mortgage interest rate
is to changes in financial market conditions. Downpayment and maturity
provisions are particularly responsive, as reflected, for example, in the
wide swings in the availability of no-downpayment thirty-year VA loans
between periods of market ease and tightness. The greater responsiveness
of such contract terms compared with that of interest rates stems from
institutional factors also. The "stickiness" of conventional mortgage rates
manifests one institutional factor,the local orientation of mortgage
markets, in which a "going rate" of exactly 5 or 6 per cent, for instance,
becomes accepted and changes only slowly.In mortgage markets,
furthermore, there is no counterpart of the investment banker who works
closely with the borrower on narrow underwriting margins, and achieves
fine-drawn pricing through discounts and premiums. The mortgage
lender dealing directly with borrowers rarely resorts to discounts and
premiums, and seldom changes contract interest rates by less than
one-fourth of a percentage point and often by not less than one-half.
Moreover, the fee or premium, often paid by a lender to a mortgage
broker or originator for "finding" loans, does not show up in a contract
interest rate series, but is included as one of the administrative costs.
For reasons growing out of market and technical peculiarities, therefore,
fairly substantial and more prolonged changes in financial conditions are
required to bring about changes in conventional mortgage interest rates.
The element of administrative costs, noted above, has its own place
in the relative stickiness of mortgage rates.In general, the larger such
costs are relative to the interest rate the more stable the interest rate is
likely to be. The reason is simple: a minimum margin must be main-
tained between the interest rate and a lender's fixed administrative costs to
assure him a reasonable return. The same reason accounts for the high
and unvarying rates on consumer credit—high costs of administering a
portfolio of consumer loans. Similarly on residential loans, administrative
costs of acquisition, servicing, and record keeping, perhaps 75 basis points
compared to 10 on corporate securities, create a relatively stable state in
residential mortgage interest rates.5
LAG IN MORTGAGE INTEREST CHANGES
Changes in mortgage interest rates lagged consistently behind changes
in bond yields throughout the postwar decade. Moreover, in each cycle
I am indebted to Roger F. Murray for helpful discussion of the basic reasons for
differences in behavior between mortgage and other long-term yields.
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the timing of the lag has been generally the same—about four quarters.
This timing pattern differs little whether the comparison is between
mortgage interest rates and yields on outstanding or on new bond issues.
Considering the imperfections in the data, the consistency of pattern is
remarkable, even though some of the cyclical differences may be obscured
by quarterly averages.
The timing of peaks and troughs for the various types of capital market
securities, evident from Chart 7, is pinpointed in Table 12.Except for
TABLE 12
Turning Points in Interest Rates and Yields on Capital Market Securities





Cycle MortgagesOutstandingsNew Issues Bonds Bonds
First 1949-I 1948-I 1948-I 1948-Ill
Second 1954-Il 1953-11 1953-lI 1953-lI 1953-Ill
LAG IN MORTGAGE RATES BEHIND BOND YIELDS
(number of quarters)
First 4 4 2





MortgagesOutstandingsNew Issues Bonds Bonds
First 195 1-I 1950-I 1949-IV 1950-I
Second 1954-Ill 1954-I 1954-Ill 1954-111
LAG IN MORTGAGE RATES BEHIND BOND YIELDS
(number of quarters)
Firsi 4 5 4
Seccnd 4 6 4 4
Soi..RcE: Figures are based on data shown in Chart 7.
outstanding bond yields reached their first postwar peak in
the first quarter of 1948 compared with the first quarter of 1949 for
mortgage interest rates. The subsequent decline in bond yields continued
to a low around the first quarter of 1950 and was accompanied by little
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changein mortgage rates. Later the rates declined to a low in the first
quarter of 1951. A new marked rise in bond yields, following the "accord"
(see Chapter 3, section on monetary and debt management policies and
liquidity of financial institutions), culminated in a mid-1953 peak for
both new and outstanding issues (except municipals), while the advance in
mortgage interest rates did not come to an end until mid-1954. The
downward phase of the second cycle, for all but the corporate issue
series, ended in a third quarter 1954 trough, again four quarters before
the trough in mortgage interest rates was reached.6
In the changed money market environment after late 1954, bond
yields—on both new and outstanding issues—rose sharply through 1956
and apparently continued to rise through the third quarter of 1957. Mort-
gage interest rates rose much less sharply through 1956. Evidence from
lenders (although actual data for 1957 are not at hand) suggests that the
advance in rates gained momentum in 1957 and was still in progress as the
year ended. The pattern of the first postwar decade suggests that the rise
probably continued through the third quarter of 1958.
The lag of about four quarters in mortgage interest rate changes
behind bond yield changes reflects the institutional structure of mortgage
interest rates and the greater responsiveness to market conditions of
changes in other mortgage terms, discussed earlier. Important also is the
influence of the commitment technique, fundamental to the mortgage
lending process. The technique, described and appraised in Chapter 7,
generally involves arrangements to provide mortgage credit in the future
under terms and conditions prevailing at the time the commitment
is made.Interest rates on mortgage loans closed, therefore, are those
in effect several months before disbursement of funds.Because life
insurance companies use the commitment method more extensively than
other types of lenders do in disbursing their funds, the lag of interest rate
series behind bond yields, shown in Chart 7, is probably greater than that
of a series based on loans closed by banks or savings and loan associations.
Alternatively, an interest rate series based on current mortgage loan com-
mitments would show a considerably shorter time lag.
COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATES ON HOME AND
INCOME PROPERTY LOANS
The data obtained in this study on conventional mortgage interest rates
for income properties—somewhat thinner than those for homes—may be
6Thetrough1 for new corporate issues is not quite clear with both the first and fourth
quarters of 1954 at about the same low level, separated by a small rise in the interim
quarters. In part, the movement reflects technical problems in the series.
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used oriiy as a broad guide to level and movements. The series shown in
Chart 8 includes chiefly loans on large-scale apartment buildings and
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Data on home mortgage loans are a weighted average of contract interest
rates reported by four life insurance companies.In income property loans data are a
weighted average of contract interest rates from two companies, one of which reported on
residential loans also. See Table A-5 below.
In accord with earlier data compiled by the National Bureau,7 findings
for the postwar decade show that interest rates on mortgage loans closed
on income properties were lower than on homes. The spread has varied
somewhat from a high between 50 and 60 basis points in 1951 to a low
between 20 and30 basis points through most of 1955and 1956.The
genei:ally lower level of rates on business type property loans is due to
two obvious advantages of such loans:largeindividual loans involve
relatively low servicing costs per dollar of loan; such loans are secured by
For a summary of data on conventional mortgage interest rates see R. J. Saulnier,
Harold G. Haicrow, and Neil H. Jacoby, Federal Lending and Loan Insurance, Princeton
University Press for NBER, 1958, Table 69.
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propertieshaving assured income from high-grade tenants renting space
under firm long-term leases.
Evidence obtained in interviews, however, suggests that the pattern is
subject to significant variations. Relatively high interest rates can often
be commanded by the comparatively few mortgage lenders able and
willing to make large individual loans of several million dollars. This is so
particularly during periods of capital market stringency when alternative
investment opportunities are plentiful. In periods such as 1953 and 1956,
the spread between mortgage interest rates on home and business property
loans narrows. Several life insurance companies reported informally that
during 1956 and early 1957 their rates on income property loans were as
high or even higher than on home loans.
The greater volatility of average interest rates on business than on
home property loans is also clear from Chart 8.It is due chiefly to the
greater influence of each individual loan on the business loan series
than on the home loan series because the number of business-property
loans is much smaller than of home loans.
LONGER-TERM MOVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
Annual data on conventional mortgage interest rates for earlier years from
National Bureau studies with more recent data developed in this study
permit the construction of the annual series from 1920 through 1956,
shown in Chart 9. Comparability of the present series (1947—1956) with
the National Bureau series (1920—1947) is made more direct by use of
earlier data for life insurance companies only. The National Bureau's
interest rate data for commercial banks and savings and loan associations
closely parallel the life insurance company data at a somewhat higher level.
The level of rates in 1 947—4.2 per cent for the last year of the National
Bureau series and 4.3 per cent for the first of the present series—speaks
for the comparability of the series and strengthens the credibility of
each.
While from 1920 to 1932 the level of mortgage interest rates remained
relatively stable, around 6 per cent, the postwar rise started from a
much lower level after a steep and steady drop of nearly fifteen years'
duration. Thus, notwithstanding the significant increase in interest rates
on both home and income property loans after World War II, levels at the
end of 1956 were still well below those of the 1920's and early 1930's.
It is likely, however, that further rises during 1957 carried the average
level considerably closer to that of thirty years earlier.
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CHART 9
Mortgage Interest Rates on Home and Income Property
Loans, 1920—1956
SouHcE: For 1920—1933 data are from J. E. Morton, Urban Mortgage Lending:
parative Markets and Experi ence, Princeton for NBER, 1956, Tables C-5 and C-8.
Corn-
For 1934—
1946 data are from unpublished tables of the National Bureau, and for 1947-1956 are from
the study. While Morton's monograph also reproduces National Bureau data for
1934—1946, these include interest rates on federally underwritten loans as well as on con-
ventional loans, and are not completely comparable with earlier or later figures on conven-
tional mortgage interest rates. Data for 1933 on income property loans are not available.
See also Table A—6 below.
FHA and VA Mortgage Interest Rates and Prices
The overriding fact about interest rates on FHA and VA mortgage loans is
their relative inflexibility. The maximum rates are established bylaw
and regulation and tend to become going market rates. The arbitrary
setting of rates outside the "free" market has been a major element
influencing the allocation of funds in the capital market, tending to attract
funds into mortgages and away from other types of investments during
periods of market ease and to restrict the flow of mortgage funds during
periods of stringency. Adjustments in FHA and VA mortgage yields made
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solvingthe basic problems inherent in a market situation characterized
by the existence of ceiling prices for one product and free prices for
competitive products (see following section on discounts and premiums
for discussion of reasons).
When World War II ended, the federal government was underwriting
mortgages made by private lenders at fixed maximum interest rates of
4 per cent for VA loans andper cent for FHA loans.Subsequent
changes in those rates, discussed in Chapter 3, are visible in Chart 7.
The early postwar rates on such government underwritten loans were
markedly higher than yields on long-term government securities, while
risks were little greater. The rates were also significantly higher than yields
on business securities. The differential more than compensated for the
higher administrative and servicing costs on FHA and VA loans compared
to those on other capital market securities.Moreover, the established
maximum interest rate for FHA mortgages was apparently at a higher
level than conventional mortgage interest rates through mid-1948, and
the rate for VA mortgages was only slightly less than conventional rates.
Under these circumstances, federally underwritten mortgages were quite
attractive to investors.
Except for a time during 1948 when bond yields were rising, the appeal
to investors of FHA and VA loans continued strong until the Federal
Reserve-Treasury "accord" of early1951.Thereafter, while other
important elements described in Chapter 3 were at work, the ebb and
flow of federally underwritten mortgage funds reflected in large part the
narrowing and widening differentials between fixed interest rates on FHA
and VA loans and changing yields on other capital market securities.
During periods of credit stringency, when yields on competitive capital
market securities rose, investment in federally underwritten mortgages
declined, but rose again when competitive yields fell during periods of
credit ease. The relationship is shown in Chart 1 and discussed in more
detail in the accompanying text. To recapitulate, inflexible interest rates
on FHA and VA loans have made an important contribution to wide
fluctuations in the flow of mortgage funds during alternating periods
of credit ease and restraint. Moreover, existence of two types of govern-
ment securities—direct obligations and loans with federal guarantees—at
yield differentials determined arbitrarily outside the "free" market but
obviously at variance with the market's evaluation of the differential
has been an important factor in capital market instability.
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DISCOUNTSAND PREMIUMS
The question to be considered here is why discounts or premiums on loans
with fixed maximum interest rates have not been effective in adjusting
yields to actual market conditions. Other capital market securities are
traded at prices above or below par in response to changing conditions,
with a resulting differential between effective yields and coupon rates.
Why :is such complete market flexibility not possible for federally under-
written mortgages? The answer lies in a myriad of factors—legal, moral,
and psychological, as well as economic—and is associated with a back-
ground of federal statutory and administrative changes. Some knowledge
of the background, briefly sketched below, is necessary to an understanding
of this basic problem.8
Regulations limiting fees and charges made by lenders and builders
again;t borrowers of FHA and VA loans have been in effect since the
beginning of the federal mortgage underwriting programs. Until 1950,
however, there were no regulations governing fees, charges, or discounts
that could be imposed by lenders upon builders or sellers of houses under
these programs. By legislation (Housing Act of 1950, Section 504), the
Veterans Administratidn and Federal Housing Administration were
required to limit the charges which could be made by lenders against
builders.Later (September 1951) charges against a seller of existing
properties were limited as well.
These Congressional actions stemmed largely from developments in pre-
ceding months during which FNMA was actively supporting the market
for VA loans through the issuance of advance commitments to purchase
such mortgages at par. With the private market price of VA loans at less
than par, lenders were able to exact discounts from builders arid turn a
profit in selling mortgages at par to FNMA. "Thus, in practical effect, the
lender was exacting a fee from the builder or sponsor for obtaining financing
The discussion following to the end of this section is based largely on information
included in the congressional reports and hearings given below.
81s1 Congress, 2nd session, Report No. 1286, Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, to accompany S. 2246, February 24,1950.81st Congress, 2nd session,
Conference Report No. 1893 to accompany S. 2246, April 5, 1950. 83rd Congress, 1st
session,SenateBanking and Currency Committee, Hearings on "Mortgage Interest Rate
Problem," January 28,1953.83rd Congress,1st session, House Veteran's Affairs
Committee Hearings on "Proposed Sale of Guaranteed Loans at a Discount," April 29,
1953.83rd Congress, 1st session, Conference Report No. 692 to accompany S. 2103,
"Housing Amendments of 1953," June 30, 1953.83rd Congress, 1st session, House
Veterans Affairs Committee, Hearings on "Proposed Sale of Guaranteed Loans at a
Discount,"May 12, 1953. 83rd Congress, 1st session, House Subcommittee on Housing of
Comriittee on Veterans Affairs, Hearings on "Fees and Charges Schedule Governing
Guaranteed Housing Loans," June 18, 1953.
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that actually represented the use of government funds.It is believed that
this was the practice which the Congress was in the main concerned about
and was desirous of curbing, although there was, in addition, concern that
the cost to the purchaser would be increased."9 The legislation enacted
was considerably broader and applied to all FHA and VA loans whether
or not sold to FNMA.
The 1950 legislation did not end the practice of mortgage discounting,
however. Lenders and builders devised numerous practices, not covered
by the law, through which discounts were considered legal or at least not
patently illegal.10 With yields on corporate and government securities
rising through most of the period to mid-1953 (Chart 7), discounts were
widespread, especially on VA loans. The VA interest rate (4 per
fixed at a lower maximum than the FHA rateper cent), led lenders to
seek to increase the effective rate by discounts and builders to obtain
liberal financing on houses to be sold.
Even so, in view of the established maximum interest rate on FHA and
VA loans, and the obvious legislative intent to limit discounts, many large
investors—particularly life insurance companies—reduced their purchases
of federally underwritten mortgages rather than resort to discounts.
The Veterans Administration, in the hearings cited, expressed the view
that the reluctance could not "be explained solely on economic grounds.
For example, a 20-year GI 4 per cent loan purchased at a 5 per cent
discount offers a yield to the investor of 4.64 per cent if. .. heldto
maturity and a somewhat higher yield [if] prepaid prior to maturity."
Rather,the Administration believedthatthereluctance stemmed
"from their apprehension that the purchase of loans at very sizable
discounts may subject them some day in the future to public censure,
or perhaps even to criminal prosecution, although the VA solicitor has
ruled that discount arrangements are legal under the act and regulations,
provided they meet certain tests and conditions."1' Such apprehension
was reported more directly in later congressional testimony."Many
Hearings on "Mortgage Interest Rate Problem," reply of Veterans Administration to
questions of Senate Banking and Currency Committee, p. 43.
10Inparticular, three practices known to be in wide general use were outlined in
Hearings on "Mortgage Interest Rate Problem," p. 40:(1) Since the statute prohibited
excessive charges against builders, sellers, and borrowers only, without mention of other
parties to a transaction, lenders collected fees from real estate brokers or acted directly as
sales brokers.(2) An agreement would be made by a lender with a builder or seller under
which a purchase of loans at par and accrued interest was agreed upon if the lender was
unable to sell such loans at par within a specified period. To guarantee such a purchase,
a deposit subject to forfeit was posted by the builder or seller.(3) A builder would close
VA loans in his own name, as a nonsupervised lender, and later sell them at a discount.
11Ibid.,p. 42.
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lenderssolicitous of their own good repute balk or shy away from going
into the program under arrangements of that kind [see footnote 9], and
they are the people that tell us, 'If you will legalize this discount so our
lawyers will not tell us to be leery of whether it is or is not proper under
the law, we will go into your program'.'2"
Soon after maximum interest rates on VA and FHA loans were increased
restriction of the described discount practices was undertaken by Veterans
Administration directive (May 1953).Builders were required to certify
that they had neither directly nor indirectly paid discounts or fees other
than taose explicitly allowable by statute or regulation.Strong protests
by builders and lenders led to legislation (June 1953) authorizing builders
and sellers to pay discounts incurred by lenders on federally underwritten
loans. Such discounts, however, could not be passed on to purchasers.'3
The limitation on covering discounts in sales transactions was one
important deterrent to their effective use in bringing yields on VA and
FHA loans into competitive range with other capital market investments.
Whereas small discounts could be covered by builders in selling price
or absorbed in profit, the larger discounts required by lenders in late 1955
and 1956 made builders and sellers increasingly reluctant to reduce,
by absorption of discounts, effective sales return on houses. Consequently
both new house builders and sellers of existing houses turned to conven-
tional mortgages with flexible interest rates and no need for discounts
to effective yields.
The question whether mortgage discounts were actually being absorbed
by builders or were passed on to veteran buyers has long been debated,
but conclusive evidence is lacking to support either contention. Because
the methods of real estate value appraisal are so inexact, one view, as
expressed by a Congressman, is that the cost of discounts could readily be
covered in the sale price of a house. A VA representative testified that
"jt was impossible to appraise houses within a 5 per cent figure. How can
you come before this committee and tell us that you think the veteran will
not have to absorb this [discount], when your people admit that you
cannot get closer than 5 per cent to the amount of money ?"Thesame
man said that "he had checked it over and over, and said that always in
some way they passed it on down to the house and to the veteran buying
12Tcstimonyof T. B. King, Assistant Deputy Director of Loan Guaranty Service,
Veterans Administration, in hearings on "Proposed Sale of Guaranteed Loans at a
Discount," p. 1035.
Thelegislation, included in the Housing Amendments Act of 1953 took the form of an
amendment to section 504 of the Housing Act of 1950. This section was finally repealed
altogether on
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the house."4 Echoing this claim, a high federal housing official stated
that, however careful a valuation system may be, "I do not think anybody
in the business will contend that it can be so careful that it will prevent"
passing back the discount to the borrower in the price of the house.'5
In answering these contentions, the Veterans Administration claimed that
the criticism not generally valid because the VA exercised appraisal
controls through refusing to recognize increases in reasonable value.
"On a number of occasions VA field offices have been exhorted to
exercise extreme care to avoid yielding to any upward pressure from
builders to permit the reflection of the discounts through higher reasonable
values.Thus. .. itis unlikely that the builder is able to recoup his
discount costs through higher valuations."The VA representative
pointed out the offsetting value of the "availability of GI loan credit
with its very low cost and liberal terms." Giving some ground, he con-
tinued: "But we cannot deny the possibility or even the probability that
in a minority of cases the builder is able to obtain higher valuations suffi-
cient to recompense him for all—or at least part—of whatever discount
he may be required to pay for his financing."16
The general question of the incidence of discounts need not be resolved
to reach agreement that the existence of regulations prohibiting the
payment of discounts by borrowers is a deterrent to the use of FHA
and VA loans.This is so particularly for existing house sales with
value appraisals not based on costs, of which the seller's discounts might
be one. In periods of credit tightness, moreover, not only increase of
discounts required by lenders, but also other factors reduced the possi-
bility of covering them in higher selling prices and thus passing them
ontoborrowers.With profit margins narrowed by increased cost
of building and of land acquisition and development, builders found
it difficult to absorb the costs of discounts as well.Thus, they tem-
porarily reduced or discontinued operations under federal guaranteed
financing.
Most lenders, also, were reluctant to place funds in federally under-
written mortgages when yields on other capital market instruments were
rising.Notwithstanding the availability of discounts on a clearly legal
l)asis after 1953, public censure was still likely, so long as discount charges
were considered at least unethical. Congressional reaction to the existence
"Statementby Representative Olin E. Teague, in questioning Mr. T. B. King, in
"Proposed Sale of Guaranteed Loans at a Discount," p. 1032.
Statementby Raymond Foley, then Administrator of the Housing and Home
Finance Agency, in "Mortgage Interest Rate Problem," p. 12.
'°"MortgageInterest Rate Problem," p. 44.
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of large discounts in tight capital markets contributed importantly to the
shaping of public opinion on this question. A subcommittee on housing
expressed stern disapproval:
"In parts of the South and West the typical price for VA-guaranteed
loans seems to fall in the 95 to 97 range. Even more disturbing are the
very frequent accounts of even larger discounts of from 7 to as much
as 10 points ....Thepersistence of these 'horror' cases and the generally
agreed upon fact of discounts as heavy as 5 to 6 per cent in some areas,
evenloans to excellent credit risks in desirable projects, has caused
the subcommittee grave concern.
The subcommittee is convinced that. .. theper cent interest
rate ... isa fair rate for a virtually riskiess investment. At the same time,
we recognize. .. that... discountsin some degree are unavoidable and
mdccc. are a necessary adjustment to changing supply and demand
relationships.Large discounts, however, should not be sanctioned.
A 7 per cent discount, for example, will give a gross yield for a twenty
five-year loan (assuming a ten-year repayment period) of 5.53 per cent.
The subcommittee regards this as an outrageous yield on a government-
guaranteed obligation at a time when long-term government loans are
yielding less than 3 per cent. Mortgages require a somewhat higher yield
than bonds, to be sure, but no one, in our opinion, can defend a spread
of such a magnitude."7
Such Congressional opinion has had a restraining influence upon
acceptance by lenders of large discounts on federally underwritten
mortgages. Large financial intermediaries, in their widely acknowledged
role as public trustees, have been less willing to risk public censure than
to igr.ore the facts of market forces. Small lenders that originate mortgage
loans directly to borrowers have found it difficult to charge discount fees,
and many have regarded the practice as something unsavory.These
attitudes were borne out in interviews with officers of large and small
institutions.Thus, from both the demand and supply side, the discount
technique, because of legal requirements and equity pressures, has proved
only partially effective in compensating for fixed maximum interest rates
in a tightening capital market.
17ReportNo. 2 of the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking
and Currency, "Mortgage Credit and FHA Multifamily Housing," January 31, 1956,
pp.
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YIELD DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN FHA, VA, AND
CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES
Market evaluation of federally underwritten mortgage loans, as reflected
in yields to investors, has seldom coincided with that of the federal
government, as reflected in maximum statutory or administrative interest
rates. During most of the first five years after World War I, FHA and
VA loans commanded premiums in the market, while in the next five years
they generally carried discounts.Investors' judgment of the value of
federal mortgage insurance and guaranty is suggested in part by the yield
spread between federally underwritten and conventional home mortgage
loans. Precise measurement of that spread and also of the spread between
FHA and VA loans is precluded by inadequacies of the data, and
interpretation is hampered by lack of knowledge about differences in
other terms of mortgage lending. Since early 1953 the Federal Housing
Administration has reported average market prices of FHA loans, and
similar data have been available from the Federal National Mortgage
Association on both FHA and.VA loans.'8These data purportedly
represent prices on secondary market transactions in mortgages available
for immediate delivery. The fact that price quotations on FHA-insured
loans reported independently by FNMA and FHA have been in close
agreement from 1953 through 1956 increases confidence in the reliability
of the data.
Comparison of FHA and VA loan prices, shown in Chart 10, indicates
that both types of mortgages have remained below par since mid-1953
(close to par through most of 1954), and that FHA loan prices have been
consistently higher than VA prices.The price spread has varied
somewhat over the years, increasing to an average of about 0.7 of a
percentage point after early 1955 compared with an average 0.4 of a
point in the two preceding years.Maximum administrative interest
rates on both mortgages were the same,per cent,throughout
the period shown in the chart.Investors' willingness, therefore,to
purchase VA loans only at a lower price (higher yield) than FHA loans
must be explained by their evaluation of other factors bearing on loan
quality.
In general, contract terms—maturities, downpayments, and loan-to-
value ratios—have been more liberal for VA loans than for FHA loans.
18FederalHousing Administration, "Average Typical Prices Offered for FHA-insured
(Section 203) ft% Horn.e Mortgage Loans—Immediate Delivery Transactions (In
Market Areas of FHA. Insuring Office Cities)";and Federal National Mortgage
Association, "Average Prices of Section 203 and 501 Mortgages by Agency Area on
Selected Dates."
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Lenders generally have regarded VA property appraisals also as tending
to be more liberal than those made by FHA.
guaranty is for 60 per cent of a loan (not to exceed
CHART10












of FHA and VA 4.5
1953—1956
Per Cent Mortgages,
SouitcE: Federal National Mortgage Association monthly release, "Average Prices of
Section 203 and 501 mortgages by Agency Area on Selected Dates."
insurance for 100 per cent of a loan, may also have influenced investors'
judgment about the quality of these mortgages.
The relative influence of each of these factors on mortgage loan prices
cannot be determined.Itisclear, however, that the market tends
to judge the quality of FHA and VA loans to a large extent on their own
notwithstanding the contingent liability assumed by the federal
government. The criterionof quality influences not only differences
between prices quoted for FHA and VA mortgages, but also differences
within one type of mortgage with varying terms. For example, FNMA's
purchase price schedule under its secondary market operations in late 1956
9'
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varied as much aspoints forboth FHAand VA mortgagesin the
same area, depending upon loan-to-value ratios and length of maturities.
Price variations by geographic area are also important, as indicated in
the last section of this chapter
CHART II
Comparison of Average Yields on VA-Guaranteed Mortgages, FHA-lnsured









Home Mortgages, Quarterly, 1953—1956
NOTE: Data on contract interest rates on conventional home mortgage loans are from
the same source indicated in Chart 7. Data on FHA and VA mortgage yields are calcu-
lated from average prices shown in Chart 10 and are based on an assumed 10-year
prepayment period and a 25-year average contract maturity. The difference in yields,
assuming a different repayment period, would have been small.See also Table A—7.
On the basis of their market prices,average FHA and VA yields
ranged between 4.6 per cent and 5.1 per cent from mid-1953 through 1956,
as shown in Chart 11.Conventional mortgage interest rates during the
same period ranged from around 4.9 to 5.1 per cent.Before
regularly published data on FHA and VA mortgage prices or yields are
available.Scattered information suggeststhat, during most ofthe
1946—1950 period, FHA loans, carrying interest rates higher than on VA
loans and for a time even higher than on conventional loans (Chart 7),
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comma rided premium prices in the market.'9 Unpublished data on FHA
mortgage prices and yields reveals that, during the period from 1948
to early 1953, their movements paralleled those of conventional mortgage
interest rates very closely. With minor exceptions, quarterly conventional
mortgage interest rates were consistently between 30 and 40 basis points
above the market yields on FHA mortgages. Data on VA mortgage
yields after mid-1953, described above, suggest a somewhat smaller
spread between them and conventional rates in earlier years than that
between FHA and conventional mortgage rates.
The spread between yields on mortgages underwritten by the federal
government and those not so protected reflects not only the existence of
the government guaranty but differences in lending terms.Federally
underwritten mortgages usually bear terms more favorableto the
borrower with respecttomaturities, downpayments, and monthly
payments.If those terms were more nearly the same, it is likely that
yields on federally underwritten mortgages would be lower and
the spread between them and conventional rates greater. Such liberal
terms, however, would hardly have been acceptable to lenders without
the federal guaranty.
All of this implies that, even with the contingent liability of the
federal government, the market does not regard FHA and VA loans as
riskiess assets.In judging them as investments it applies traditional
standards of quality, just as in judging conventional mortgages. Thus,
from the point of view of the lender, government underwritten loans with
alladvantages noted, if secured by poorly located or otherwise less
desirable properties, will command lower prices or higher yields than loans
on more favorable or less risky properties. Most lenders interviewed in the
coursc of this study agreed with the implications just pointed out. Among
the most frequently mentioned reasons for judging government under-
written loans on their own merits were:(1) the social obligation of
large financial intermediaries to screen and select mortgages carefully;
(2) the cost of dealing with delinquencies and defaults, which several large
institutions had found to vary directly with the liberality of loan terms;
(3) the unwillingness of lenders to be associated with foreclosures and
bad loans;(4)the disadvantages of reinvesting foreclosed mortgage
funds at unfavorable times;(5) the lack of full coverage by the Federal
For example, in congressional hearings on the "Mortgage Interest Rate Problem,"
Raymond Foley, then Housing Administrator, said: "... someyears ago when we were
on aper cent rate in the section 203 operation, the detached one- to four-family house
operalion in some areas of the country, the insured mortgage was commanding high
premiums 103, sometimes 104."
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Housing Administration of foreclosure and associated costs;(6)the
greater risk exposure of VA loans, having a maximum $7,500 guarantee,
in the face of the increasing size of loans.To fortify itself against that
risk exposure, one large financial institution adopted a policy against
accepting VA loans if the unguaranteed portion excecdcd 50 per cent
of the appraised value of the property.
The views just set forth about risk, yield, and terms on federally
underwritten loans are, however, opposed by a minority view held by
some large institutional lenders. They hold that such loans are essentially
riskiess and should be acquired strictly on the basis of yield comparison
with direct Treasury obligations and Aaa corporate bonds without con-
sidering other characteristics. They regard most of the factors noted above
as more than offset by other aspects of the government guaranty. Loans
acquired at discounts and later foreclosed are repaid by the government
at par. This practice often results in a profit or premium to the lender
despite the costs incurred in administering the loan, attempting to forestall
default, and reinvesting recaptured funds. The ultimate conclusions
suggested are that the sooner a discounted mortgage goes to foreclosure the
better for the investor and that the poorer the quality of a federally under-
written mortgage the higher its prices should be. The market place,
however, has not yet accepted this extreme view, and prices are still directly
related to quality, as they are in the conventional mortgage market.
The differential between average contract interest rates on conventional
loans and yields on federally underwritten loans was considerably wider
during the 1954—1955 period of capital market ease than in periods
of market stringency before and after that (Chart 11). These changes in
yield differentials have resulted chiefly from swings in FHA and VA yields;
conventional interest rates have moved within a fairly narrow range. The
pattern reflects, in part, technical inadequacies in the two series and
differences between them; in part it depicts actual market influence.
Technically, the yield data are based on price quotations reported by
FHA and FNMA field offices for typical transactions on immediate
deliveries (Chart 10). They are simple averages not weighted by trans-
actions and hence subject to greater fluctuation as quoted "spot" prices
change. Also, the inclusion of transactions not based on prior commit-
ments results in a series more sensitive to market changes. The conven-
tional interest rate series, as noted previously, is a weighted average of
loans closed by life insurance companies based mainly on prior commit-
ments.It is therefore likely to be generally sluggish and less sensitive to
immediate market changes than FHA and VA yields.
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Amongmarket influences bearing upon yield changes in the various
series are not only changes in market conditions, but also changes in loan
composition, including the quality of loans, geographic representation,
loan acquisition and servicing costs, and other related factors.The
influence of these factors on the various series is not measurable. Yield
differentials should be considered, therefore, as only approximations of
the true situation. The slight rise, shown in Chart 11, of FHA and VA
yields over conventional interest rates for a time in 1953 and 1956 can
be interpreted realistically to mean only that differentials narrowed
marked.y at those times compared with other periods of market ease.
If the technical comparability of the series were better,itis likely,
given the basic differences between conventional and federally under-
written loans, that a truer picture of slightly higher conventional rates
would have been shown.
Additional basic reasons may be suggested for the changing yield spread
between conventional and federally underwritten mortgages during
periods of capital market tightness and ease. In tight markets institutional
lenders generally have a choice of investment outlets and are able to place
funds ia high-yield conventional mortgages on conservative terms for
downpayments and maturities. Furthermore, they can be more stringent
in selecting borrowers and properties and hence reduce their risk exposure.
In this setting, lenders are reluctant to place funds in federally under-
written mortgages unless yields are close to those on conventional
mortgages. When markets ease and lenders find it more difficult to
invest all their capital funds profitably, they are more willing to acquire
federally underwritten mortgages at wider yield differentials. Demands
by borrbwers for such liberal-term mortgages increase faster than demands
for conventional mortgages, which lenders cannot acquire in the desired
quantities.Rates on conventional mortgage loans therefore decline,
but only slowly because of institutional and traditional factors previously
discussed. The decline in yields is probably greater than in contract
interest rates because lenders are willing to pay a premium for high
quality conventional loans at good rates. This is particularly characteristic
of such lenders as life insurance companies, which acquire loans frequently
through mortgage companies.
Geographic Variation in Mortgage Yields
Unlike corporate or government securities, which are issued and traded in
national markets at nationally quoted yields, mortgages are originated and
traded in numerous local markets at varying yields. Both the course of
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real estate values and the fortunes of mortgage borrowers are closely
linked with local area developments. State laws with differing treatment
of rights of mortgagors and mortgagees and the general complexity of
legal arrangements tie transactions to the local rather than national
level.While the interregional flow of mortgage funds has accelerated
since the advent of federal mortgage insurance and guaranty, prudent
lenders carefully appraise the economic, legal, and social climate of areas
under consideration for lending.
The local character of mortgage marketsisresponsiblefor the
geographic variation in mortgage interest rates and yields. There is no
national mortgage rate;series discussed in preceding sections are only
broad averages of varying geographic rates and yields. Within regional
and national averages, prices and yields will, of course, vary between
individual mortgages, based on the previously discussed factors of security,
borrower, and terms. On mortgages of comparable quality secured by
properties in different regions, however, yields vary because of a host of
factors associated with local areas and because of the institutional arrange-
ments for mortgage financing, although these differentials have declined
substantially over the years.2°
Limited current data on regional mortgage yields clearly indicate that
differentials—though narrower than in earlier years—persist.Price
quotations on VAper cent mortgages, reported to FNMA by field
agencies in late 1956, for example, varied from a low of 93.6 in the
Los Angeles area to a high of 96.4 in the Philadelphia area (Table 13).21
These prices represent yields of about 5.60 and 5.10, respectively, if a
prepayment period of eight years is assumed on a twenty-five year
mortgage. The differential of about 0.50 basis points is not much smaller
than that in 1940 (footnote 20). On FHA 5 per cent mortgages, the 1956
differential between the Los Angeles and Philadelphia areas was somewhat
smaller. Despite the increased interregional flow of mortgage funds and
use of the process of arbitrage, regional yield variations have apparently
narrowed little throughout the postwar period. Several reasons may be
suggested for the persistence of variations in regional mortgage yields.
20"In1890 the spread between the regions with the highest and lowest effective
(residential mortgage) interest rates was 3.8 percentage points.In 1920 the spread in
terms of contract rates was 2.2 points; in 1934, 1.4 points; in 1940, 0.6 point. In 1950 the
median first mortgage interest rate ... ineach of the four major census regions was 5.0
per cent ....Thetendency towards smaller regional differences ... hasresulted both
from the improvement of lending facilities and the decrease in risks of mortgage lending
in what were young regions in 1890 and from greater mobility of mortgage funds, through
which local markets became less isolated." (Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, op. cit., p. 229.)
21Fromthe Federal National Mortgage Association, "Average Prices of Section 203
and 501 Mortgages by Agency Area on Selected Dates."
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TABLE 13
Regional Prices for VA-Guaranteed Mortgages, by FNMA Agency Area,
January and June, 1953-1956









SOIJRE: Federal National Mortgage Association, "Average Prices of Section 203 and
501 Mortgages by Agency Area on Selected Dates."
1. The geographic concentration of capital and the predominance of
local lenders in some areas of the country have tended to make for rate
differentials.Mortgage rates in eastern financial centers—Boston, New
York, and Philadelphia, for example—-are generally lower than in the
Southwest and Far West where there is a scarcity of capital relative to
demands for it.
2. Though fluidity of mortgage funds between areas has been consider-
ably increased by the introduction of federal mortgage insurance and
guaranty, it is by no means complete.
3. Costs of acquiring and servicing mortgages away from a lender's
home base make for higher gross yields in capital-scarce areas.
4. Variations among state laws governing foreclosure and borrower
redemption rights make recovery of funds in case of default more or less
costly and difficult for lenders.Prospective difficulties naturally call
for higher yield requirements by the lender. In Michigan, for example,
the extended period of redemption has resulted in increased preference by
lender's for the land contract over the mortgage loan.
5. Mortgage yield differentials result from variations in economic
factors tending to influence area real estate and construction markets, such
as industrial stability and growth, expansion in population, diversification
of industry, and zoning ordinances, as well as lenders' appraisals of the
long- and short-term economic potential.
6. A common desire among national lendersfor geographically
diversified mortgage portfolios tends to keep regional rates apart.For
example, some large eastern financial institutions, in order to maintain
what they consider appropriate diversification,will place funds in
Pennsylvania mortgages at par, for example, even though California
mortgages are available to them at 96.
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Other broad reasons for continued geographic variation in mortgage
yieldslie in the imperfections still remaining in mortgage markets.
Neither lenders nor borrowers have complete knowledge of transactions.
Institutional arrangements for acquisition of mortgages tend to perpetuate
yield differentials between areas and within the same market area.
Yields in an area on mortgages of comparable quality, for example,
may vary because one large financial institution intent upon increasing its
mortgage investments thereiswilling to acquire them through its
correspondent at prices above those generally prevailing. Prices of other
mortgage originators in the area, however, are not affected because funds
from that institution are not available to them.
98